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Abstrakt
Tato práce se zaměřuje na vyvinutí nástrojů pro výkonnostní testování, které umožní otesto-
vat infrastrukturu systému MIT Kerberos, zjistit její výkonnostní charakteristiky a deteko-
vat potenciální problémy. Práce shrnuje teoretické základy protokolu Kerberos a analyzuje
potenciální výkonnostní problémy v různých konfiguracích MIT Kerberosu. Dále práce ob-
sahuje popis návrhu a implementace sady nástrojů pro distribuované testování. Pomocí im-
plementovaných nástrojů bylo odhaleno několik výkonnostních problémů, které jsou v práci
popsány spolu s návrhem jejich řešení.
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to develop performance test suite, which will enable to test MIT
Kerberos system infrastructure, assess gained performance characteristics and detect po-
tential bottlenecks. This thesis summarizes necessary theoretical background of Kerberos
protocol. Potential performance problems are analyzed on different MIT Kerberos config-
urations. This thesis describes distributed test suite design and implementation. Several
performance problems were discovered using this test suite. These problems are described
and some solutions are proposed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ensuring safety is one of significant problems of today’s computer networks. It is essential
to authenticate users and machines safely in the whole network.
One of the systems dealing with this problem is Kerberos developed at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. This system is deployed in environments with tens of thousands of
users, which puts pressure on performance of the whole solution.
The aim of this thesis is to develop performance test suite, which will enable to test Ker-
beros system infrastructure, assess gained performance characteristics and detect potential
bottlenecks with minimum effort.
In the second chapter necessary terminology is introduced and principles of Kerberos
protocol are explained, which is necessary for understanding the system operation.
The third chapter focuses on general overview of Kerberos infrastructure and ways of
using this technology by applications.
The fourth chapter gives summary of various possibilities of MIT Kerberos configu-
ration. For each described variant of configurations, reasons for using it are stated and
potential performance impact is estimated.
The fifth chapter is focused on analysis of the parts of infrastructure where bottleneck
could possibly occur. Infrastructure is analyzed as a whole and then potentially problematic
parts are described.
Design and implementation of performance test suite is described in the sixth chapter.
The chapter summarizes information necessary for running test suite in target environment.
The seventh chapter contains evaluation of implemented test suite. Discovered bottle-
necks are described and their solution is proposed in this chapter.
The eighth chapter documents how to write own testing plugins and deals with possi-
bilities of further development.
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Chapter 2
Kerberos theoretically
Kerberos is the name of a system which enables secure mutual authentication and crypto-
graphic key exchange through an insecure channel. The system is dependant on the trusted
third-party which provides authentication and key exchange.
Further, the system enables to use single-sign-on. Upon logging in user is authenticated
(e.g. by password) and there is no more need of direct user’s interaction while authentication
to particular services (i.e. user writes password only once at the beginning of the session).
2.1 Terminology
Listed below is used terminology specific to the Kerberos authentication system. The terms
are given in logical order, so that they follow-up while reading. The terminology corresponds
with [4] and [21].
Kerberized service, environment Services able to use Kerberos for secure authentica-
tion are called
”
kerberized“. Each kerberized service has to have appropriate principal and
key in the system. (It is also possible that more services share one principal and key, but it
is not recommended.)
Principal It is unique entity identifier. The entity exists in Kerberos system (database)
and can be authenticated. Entity can he both user (human) and service (machine). Au-
thentication process is the same in both cases and it is not necessary to distinguish between
them.
Figure 2.1 compares generic principal format with common formats specific for user and
service principals. Standard [21, p. 97–100] defines other possible identifier formats. Various
formats are processed the same way. That is why only formats given in the figure will be
used in the following text.
Instance The meaning of this item depends on whether it is user’s principal or service’s
principal.
This part is optional for user’s principal. It enables to create more identities to one user
name and user can use them for different purposes.1
1Typically, administrators have one unprivileged principal which they use for common work, and one
privileged principal with the
”
admin“ instance.
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Generic principal: any-string︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal name
@any-string︸ ︷︷ ︸
realm
User principal: spacek︸ ︷︷ ︸
username
/admin︸ ︷︷ ︸
instance
@IT.ZOO.CZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
realm
Service principal: host︸︷︷︸
service
/gw.it.zoo.cz︸ ︷︷ ︸
FQDN
@IT.ZOO.CZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
realm
Figure 2.1: Principal format examples. User and service principals are each in one of common
formats.
Instance is usually required by implementations if the principal belongs to service or
machine. In that case instance has to contain Fully Qualified Domain Name of the machine.
Realm Last part of the principal after the @ mark indicates particular Kerberos system
installation (instance of the whole Kerberos system). One realm is managed as one adminis-
trative unit. The whole realm shares single database of principals (which can be optionally
replicated to more KDCs).
Realm name is case-sensitive. Usually it is the same as DNS domain name to which the
realm belongs, written in capital letters. (Other formats of naming realms are standardized,
see [21, p. 97–99].)
Client and Server Both terms have a narrowed meaning in Kerberos context [21, p.
14–15]. Client and Server are two principals with corresponding keys. Client initiates com-
munication and then client does authentication by the user’s name against server (service).
Servers in the typical wider meaning belonging to the Kerberos infrastructure are called
specific names, such as Key Distribution Centre, Authentication Server and Ticket Granting
Server.
Key Each principal has its own secret key, which is shared by client and Key Distribution
Centre (KDC). KDC stores principal name and matching key in its own database.2 This
secret key is used for mutual authentication between various entities and KDC. As storing
user’s key in client computer is not desirable, the user’s secret key is typically derived from
his password.
Key Distribution Centre (KDC) It is a central point which mediates authentication
between clients and servers. There can be several KDCs in a network. Each KDC has to have
access to principal database and appropriate keys. The KDC database has to be secured at
the most because of using symmetric cryptography. Attacker can impersonate any entity if
database is compromised.
KDC itself is logically divided into three parts: database, Authentication Server (AS)
and Ticket Granting Server (TGS). AS and TGS are usually implemented within one pro-
cess.
2Original Kerberos standardized by [21] uses only conventional (shared secret key) cryptography. Support
for public key cryptography is later defined by PKINIT extension [30].
5
Authentication Server (AS) It is a component of KDC providing
”
logging to realm“.
Based on a request it creates data structure called Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), which
it sends back to client after encrypting it with the key of the requesting principal.
Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) Data structure enabling its holder to request new
tickets for authentication to other servers from Ticket Granting Server (usually for a limited
time). TGT authenticates requester’s identity in relation to AS, i.e. confirms logging user
into realm.
Ticket Data structure which together with a fresh Authenticator enables to prove identity
of its holder in client↔ server relationship. Furthermore, it includes session key – temporary
key for decrypting data within one relation. Ticket structure is shown in fig. 2.5.
One ticket always concerns one pair of client↔ server. In other words, one client always
has one ticket per server.
Ticket Granting Server (TGS) KDC’s component which generates new ticket for
mutual authentication of client and server. Ticket is issued based on client’s request and
valid TGT.
Authenticator Data structure containing information enabling to verify that it was
”
freshly“ generated by using session key (this key is known only by client and server).
It can be e.g. timestamp encrypted with session key. [21, p. 14]
2.2 Environmental Assumptions
Kerberos protocol provides safe authentication when the following restricting conditions
are met [21, p. 12–13]:
• Cryptographic keys must be stored safely. When an attacker for example gains prin-
cipal’s key, he can impersonate it.
• The system supposes using strong enough passwords. It is possible to catch encrypted
messages and find out the principal’s password by brute-force attack.
• Real time clocks in individual systems are synchronized with several minute precision.
Time synchronization must be done safely.
Further, the protocol itself solves neither protection against Denial of Service attacks nor
Access Control Lists administration.
2.3 Kerberos protocol
The whole Kerberos system is based on using symmetric cryptography. It uses cryptographic
keys shared by each entity and KDC. Shared key is used for safe authentication of both
parties, which will be described later.
All five versions of Kerberos protocol use symmetric cryptography and aim at the same
objective: to provide safe authentication and key exchange. Versions 1–3 were used only
internally at MIT, where the protocol originates from [4, p. 7].
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Version number 4 was the first publicly available and practically used. Implementations
of this protocol are still used in older systems. From today’s point of view, dependence on
the DES cryptographic algorithm is a weak point of this version. Cryptographic keys of
this algorithms can be broken into within hours by using brute-force attack with today’s
technologies [15].
The current version has number 5. It enables to use various cryptographic algorithms,
changes wire-format of protocol and adds some extensions. Basic principles are preserved
though.
This thesis aims at the last version of the protocol. No particular attention is paid to
version 4, as it is not considered safe due to the used cryptographic algorithm and it has
been labelled End-of-life [27] by MIT for more than five years.
2.3.1 Basic principles
Basic requirement is that client and server share a secret key with KDC (shared only by a
pair entity ↔ KDC). This is used by KDC for providing authentication between client and
server.
Figure 2.2 illustrates basic process of authentication of client and server by sending
messages. Individual messages are in fact transmitted through the network the way it is
shown. Their meaning will be described in detail further in this chapter. Only the basic
principle is summarized here.
Authentication
Server Client
Ticket Granting
Server
Key Distribution Centre Application
Server
1. login request
2. reply with TGT
3. service ticket request
4. reply with new ticket
5. authentication request
6. (optional) reply
Figure 2.2: Basic message exchanges in Kerberos. Authentication Server and Ticket Grant-
ing Server are logical parts of Key Distribution Centre.
Before client tries to authenticate to server, it has to be logged in realm and obtain ticket
for the particular server. Logging in means obtaining a new Ticket Granting Ticket from
Authentication Server. (Details are given in subsection 2.3.2, description of the principle
follows.)
Client starts logging by sending request to AS, which is step 1 in the figure. AS accepts
the request and creates new cryptographic key (the so-called session key), which will be
inserted in the reply.
Then AS sends reply to the client (step 2). The reply has two main parts: One contains
new Ticket Granting Ticket, which is encrypted with the secret key of Ticket Granting
Server. The second part of the reply is encrypted with the secret key of the client. (Client
will derive its key e.g. from the entered password.)
The new session key now exists in two copies: The first copy is in the part of the reply
which can be decrypted by the client. The second copy is inside TGT.
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When the client sends the obtained TGT to TGS in step 3, the shared cryptographic key
is safely established. As mentioned above, TGT is encrypted with the server’s (i.e. TGS)
key and contains new session key.
Both client and server use shared key for mutual authentication. The basic idea is that
when client knows the session key (i.e. it is able to encrypt given data by using it), he must
have entered the correct password. Client wouldn’t have been able to decrypt the reply
and obtain the session key without the correct password (and thus also without the correct
key). Analogously, the knowledge of the session key proves the identity of the server.
Basic principle of establishing new shared cryptographic key is used also upon obtaining
tickets for other servers (steps 3 and 4). The session key established upon logging into realm
is used for encrypting messages though. Details are given in subsection 2.3.3.
Client’s authentication while communication with server (steps 5 and 6) uses the prin-
ciples of shared key, too. Another session key will be used in this step: the session key
established upon obtaining ticket for particular server. Server’s authentication is not oblig-
atory here. Particular differences are described in subsection 2.3.4.
Consequences Described exchange of new session keys means that one ticket is usable
only for one pair of client ↔ server. One particular client has to request individual ticket
for each server. The new ticket is encrypted with the server’s key and contains new session
key. Client can have more tickets at the same time.
Although it is necessary to request new ticket for every server, the described protocol in
fact offers single-sign-on. The user’s password is used only upon obtaining TGT and further
tickets are issued by TGS based on this. Details are given in chapter 2.3.3.
Other problems to be solved Previous text supposed that the client and server know
the address of KDC. These and other problems have to be solved and there is a special
chapter dedicated to them.
For further explanation of the protocol principles a very simple infrastructure is used.
It is shown in figure 2.3 with one client, server and KDC, which has principal database
stored locally. All components are configured statically, so it is not necessary to look up
information about current realm, KDC’s address etc.
client KDC and DB server
Figure 2.3: The Simplest Kerberos infrastructure
Diagrams in the following text show sending messages including their content. Contents
are given only for items necessary for explaining the principles. Details of message format
such as version numbers, bit-flags and other are omitted.
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KRB_AS_REQ
client name
server name
realm
nonce
pre-authentication
(optional)
}
client’s
KRB_AS_REP
client name
client realm
pre-authentication
(optional)
TGS’s
{
ticket – TGT
(see fig. 2.5)
client’s

session key
nonce
end-time
server name
server realmAS
client
1
2 3
4
Figure 2.4: Obtaining TGT – request from client to the Authentication Server and reply.
2.3.2 Obtaining Ticket Granting Ticket (Logging Into Realm)
As it was already said, logging in realm practically means obtaining valid Ticket Granting
Ticket (ticket for TGS). TGS then provides issuing tickets for other servers based on TGT
and Authenticator.
The whole system would be functional even without TGT, if encrypting with user’s
secret key were always used upon each request for ticket. Implementation of single-sign-on
would practically mean though that the secret key has to be stored somewhere for the whole
session, which means a safety risk. For example, a harmful code run by a logged-in user
could read user’s key etc.
Mechanism of issuing tickets based on TGT thus serves as a protection of the key (and
subsequently password, too) of user [14].
Logging in realm is initiated by client sending request for TGT to AS.
Upon communication with AS the client’s secret key shared with AS is used. In case of
user’s principals secret key is usually derived from entered password.
Figure 2.4 shows sending messages between client and AS, including the most fundamen-
tal items. Client first creates message KRB_AS_REQ. Item client name contains identification
of the requesting principal and server name contains principal of the
”
krbtgt“ service, which
is actually served by TGS on KDC. Value nonce is set to a random number generated by
client and it serves as a protection against replay attacks.
After obtaining request, AS fills in structure for reply with data according to figure
2.4 and encrypts some parts of the reply. It copies values client name, server name, realm
and nonce from the request. It fills in item end-time with value
”
validity end time“ of the
assigned ticket according to local policy. Session key is a randomly generated cryptographic
key which will be used by client upon further communication with TGS.
In the reply to the client there is also Ticket Granting Ticket. It is a ticket to Ticket
Granting Server with which a client can request for issuing tickets for other servers (i.e.
services). Structure of the ticket is the same with TGT and common ticket (see fig. 2.5).
A part of the ticket is encrypted with the secret key of the server for which the ticket was
issued.
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Ticket includes a short non-encrypted part which contains the name of the server and
the realm for which the ticket was issued. According to this non-encrypted part the server
chooses the key that has to be used for decrypting of the received ticket. This non-encrypted
part enables one server to belong to more realms at the same time.
server name
realm
}
cleartext
session key
client name
client realm
end-time
 server’s
Figure 2.5: Generic Kerberos Ticket structure.
It is worth noticing that entries end-time a session key appear in the reply twice: Once
in TGT and once in the part destined for client. Duplication of the data is useful here
because each part is encrypted with different key and neither client nor TGS are able to
decrypt all items.
Client decrypts his part of the reply by using his secret key. After decrypting he compares
sent and received nonce value. If the values differ, an error while decrypting received data
probably occurred. The most probable reason for this error is entering wrong password by
user (client’s secret key is typically derived from the password). Another reason may be an
attempt of replay attack, which is revealed by this mechanism.
If nonce values are identical, client stores his received ticket for TGS and associates the
obtained session key with the ticket.
There is an interesting characteristic of the protocol: AS issues TGT without authenti-
cating requester. Thus client can request TGT for any principal without proving its identity.
If the requested principal exists, AS simply returns a new TGT to the client. As both copies
of session key are encrypted in the reply, there is no immediate risk of misusing the obtained
TGT, but there is an opportunity for an off-line brute-force attack against the client’s (and
TGS’s) secret key.
For this reason there is a mechanism of pre-authentication, which uses optional items
shown in figure 2.4 with summarizing name pre-authentication. Description of this mecha-
nism and further extension is in the subsection 2.3.6.
2.3.3 Obtaining Service Ticket
In order to authenticate to server, client needs to obtain valid ticket for it first. This ticket
is generated by TGS based on valid TGT and a request containing Authenticator.
Simply said, obtaining ticket for particular server is a step necessary for safe establishing
of shared cryptographic key between client and server. There are three different
”
session
keys“ necessary to be distinguished in the following text:
Newly established key between server and client is called new session key in the following
text. TGS and client share TGT session key. Sub-session key is different from the previously
mentioned ones and it will be introduced later.
Figure 2.6 shows the procedure how client gets ticket for particular server. Basic principle
is the same as with obtaining TGT. Differences are in using different cryptographic keys
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on the side of both client and TGS.3
KRB_TGS_REQ
server name
server realm
nonce
TGT (inside pre-
authentication)
}
TGS’s
authenticator (see
fig. 2.7, inside
pre-authentication)
 TGTsession
KRB_TGS_REP
client name
client realm
server’s
{
ticket (for server)
(see fig. 2.5)
TGT
session
/sub-
session

(new) session key
nonce
end-time
server name
server realm
TGS
client
1
2 3
4
Figure 2.6: Obtaining ticket for server – request from client to Ticket Granting Server and
reply. Highlighted parts are different from obtaining TGT (compare with fig. 2.4).
Client has to include valid TGT and newly generated Authenticator in the request.
Client proves his identity by correct encrypting of the Authenticator. Generating and vali-
dating of the Authenticator is necessary because the TGT itself can be captured as a whole
while being transmitted via network. Thus it is possible to capture ticket and make a replay
of the captured ticket [21, p. 29]. Detailed explanation is given further in the text.
The whole TGT is encrypted with TGS key (which is not known by client), so the client
only copies the whole TGT into the request and does nothing else with it.
Client has to know TGT session key for generating the Authenticator. It is a key which
client obtained after logging in realm (and it is inside the encrypted TGT at the same time,
see subsection 2.3.2). Client fills in the Authenticator according to fig. 2.7, encrypts it as a
whole by TGT session key and then inserts the encrypted block into the request to TGS.
client name
client realm
checksum (optional)
timestamp
sub-session key (optional)
sequence number (optional)

session
Figure 2.7: Authenticator structure.
Authenticator contains some items that haven’t been described yet. Checksum is com-
3Figure is a little simplified. In fact the items TGT and Authenticator are stored in the structure
AP REQ, which is a part of the mandatory item pre-authentication as a whole [21, p. 61, 74–75, 85–86].
(Structure AP REQ is used while proving identity to application server. This structure will be later discussed
in the subsection about mutual authentication of server and client. These details are now omitted because
they don’t have an impact on the described principle of the function.)
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puted from non-encrypted parts of request by some (collision-proof) hashing function [21,
p. 37]. Timestamp and sequence number serve as a protection against replay attacks. Sub-
session key item can be filled in by the client with new cryptographic key which should be
used for encrypting reply from TGS.
After receiving the request, TGS first decrypts the included TGT by its secret key
and verifies that TGT is still valid and hasn’t been revoked. (KDC keeps a database of
tickets revoked before expiring their validity [21, p. 40] for cases such as theft of key etc.)
If everything is all right, TGS reads the TGT session key inside. It decrypts Authenticator
in the request with this key.
Verification of decrypted Authenticator’s validity follows; it consists of consistency ver-
ification of values checksum, timestamp, sequence number and others.
For example timestamp has to have a difference from current time within a permit-
ted tolerance, name and realm of the client has to be the same as the content of TGT,
Authenticator as a whole must not be repeated (same timestamp, sequence number . . . )
etc.
From the fact that the Authenticator is correct it can be deduced that the client who
had sent the message is the one he declares to be:
Authenticator is correct→ it was created by someone who knows TGT session key from
TGT issued to client→ in order to read TGT session key the respective had to decrypt the
reply from AS including TGT session key and whole TGT (see fig. 2.4) → the respective
knows client’s secret key→ the secret key is known only by the client and KDC→ we trust
KDC, therefore it must be the right client.
If the Authenticator is valid and all other checks have run without failure, TGS creates
reply including a new ticket according to the client’s request. TGS generates new session
key, which will be used by client for communication with server. New session key will be
inserted in the ticket and in the encrypted part destined for client at the same time. Filling
in other items is the same as with generating TGT.
Before the reply is sent, the ticket is encrypted with secret key of the server for which
it is destined. Data for client are encrypted with sub-session key, if it was present in the
received Authenticator. If client hasn’t specified the sub-session key, the reply is encrypted
with the current TGT session key.
Processing of received reply on the client side is basically the same as processing TGT.
It is worth noticing that client’s secret key is never used in the whole process of obtaining
new ticket for server. TGT session key is used instead. It reduces opportunities for capturing
message encrypted with client’s secret key and thus a brute-force attack against client’s
password is made more difficult.
An interesting feature of the protocol is that no KDC component communicates with
server directly. All information destined for server is in the encrypted ticket which is sent
together with the rest of the reply to client. To a client ticket is a block of data which
cannot be decrypted and client forwards it to the server for which it was issued.
2.3.4 Client – Server Mutual Authentication
After obtaining ticket for particular server, client can authenticate. Kerberos version 5
supports two kinds of authentication: One-way – only client → server, and two-way –
mutual authentication client ↔ server.
Figure 2.8 shows sending messages while authentication. Upon one-way authentication
it is enough to send server KRB_AP_REQ message. If client requests two-way authentication,
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server must further send KRB_AP_REP reply. Messages for reporting failures and replies to
client can be encapsulated into application protocol, if it is required by the application
protocol [21, p. 30].
KRB_AP_REQ
options
ticket
(see fig. 2.5)
}
server’s
authenticator
(see fig. 2.7)
}
session
KRB_AP_REP
session

client’s timestamp
sub-session key
(optional)
sequence number
(optional)server
client
1
2 3
4
client → server server → client
Figure 2.8: Mutual client ↔ server authentication – request from client to the application
server and reply. The green line separates client ↔ server authentication phase from server
→ client phase.
Ticket can be used repetitively for authentication within the validity time, it is not
necessary to request for new ticket before each authentication. Repetitive use of the ticket
also means that session key included is used repeatedly, too. This problem is solved by
sub-session key, as described later.
Client’s authentication is based on the same principle as upon communication between
client and TGS: Authentication requires valid ticket, freshly generated Authenticator and
also uses system time. Details concerning using Authenticator are given in subsection 2.3.3
from the page 12 onwards.
Server does authentication by sending the client back another representation of times-
tamp obtained from client within Authenticator (server exchanges microseconds↔ seconds
items).
There is sub-session key item in Authenticator and the reply. In this case it is used
according to the application, sending sub-session key as a part of Authenticator doesn’t
cause automatic encrypting of the reply with this key [21, p. 33]. Likewise, sequence number
item is at disposal to the application, it can be used e.g. for negotiating over starting value
of the sequence number.
If client and server communicate in more
”
conversations“ at the same time and don’t use
sub-session key, the following risk arises [14]: An attacker has a theoretical chance to take
messages from one conversation and insert them into another. As the same cryptographic
key is used (session key included in the ticket from KDC), the messages can be decrypted
at the recipient side. Further acting then depends on the application protocol, which is
transmitted inside the encrypted messages.
Using new sub-session key for each conversation prevents the described attack. The
described exchange of messages ensures only authentication and safe exchange of crypto-
graphic keys. Agreement on new sub-session key, choice of cryptographic algorithms and
other implementation details are left to application programmers.
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2.3.5 Application message integrity and confidentiality
Protocol of Kerberos version 5 also provides support for transmitting messages with ensur-
ing either only integrity or both integrity and confidentiality. Applications may or may not
use this functionality; application programmers can use (sub-)session key any other way.
Significant case where these mechanisms are used is password changing protocol. The
mentioned protocol is supported by MIT and Microsoft Kerberos implementations [26]. For
this reason very brief description of used principles follows.
These mechanisms are not usually used by common applications, though. MIT Kerberos
Consortium doesn’t recommend to use them when creating new applications [20, p. 4].
Both mechanisms assume that communicating parties already have an agreed crypto-
graphic key and eventually initial sequence number. In both cases user data are encapsulated
within a structure, whose part is encrypted with the agreed key.
collision-proof keyed (→ key
included in computation)
message body checksum
 sub/session
user data
source address
remote address (optional)
timestamp (optional)
sequence number (optional)

cleartext
message
body
Figure 2.9: KRB SAFE structure for message
transport with integrity assurance.
user data
source address
remote address (optional)
timestamp (optional)
sequence number (optional)

sub/
session
Figure 2.10: KRB PRIV structure for mes-
sage transport with confidentiality assur-
ance.
For ensuring integrity, collision-proof keyed checksum4 is calculated before sending data
and it is attached to the non-encrypted part of the message, see fig. 2.9. The recipient then
verifies checksum against contents of the request.
If checksum doesn’t match, data were changed at transport. Attacker is not able to
calculate the correct checksum because cryptographic key is included in the calculation and
the attacker doesn’t know the key.
Message for ensuring confidentiality is only a little different from the message for ensur-
ing integrity, compare figures 2.10 with 2.9. The difference lies in the fact that practically
all data are encrypted and message doesn’t include checksum. Encrypting prevents from
reading data and makes (meaningful) modification impossible without knowing the key at
the same time.
2.3.6 Pre-authentication and PKINIT extension
After switching on pre-authentication client has to include in the request for TGT some
data (e.g. current timestamp) encrypted with its own secret key. AS then issues TGT to
client only if it succeeds in decrypting and verifying the requested data in the received
request.
4The term was taken over from [21, p. 7, 42]. In other words, it is a hashing function which processes
input data and cryptographic key at the same time.
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For example, in case of timestamp verification means checking that the time in the
request corresponds with the current time within certain tolerance and the timestamp
hadn’t been used by the client before.
If the encrypted value doesn’t correspond with the expected or pre-authentication item
is not included in the request, AS rejects to issue TGT and replies the client with a error
message. The error message contains list of allowed pre-authentication methods [21, p. 25].
It is practically impossible to obtain TGT without knowing the password. Furthermore,
AS can detect unsuccessful authentication, which is impossible without pre-authentication.
RFC standardizing Kerberos version 5 [21] defines many other ways of pre-authentication.
Very interesting extension PKINIT is described further in the text.
Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
Original Kerberos uses only symmetric cryptography with all advantages and disadvantages.
Considering the fact that for “human” users client’s secret key is usually derived from the
entered password, the security of the whole system depends on the strength and secreting
of the used passwords [21, p. 13].
Within environments where Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) exists it can be advanta-
geous to use existing infrastructure of authentication of users also within Kerberos. PKINIT
extension is defined in the newer RFC 4556 [30].
Only the phase of obtaining TGT by client is changed. Other operations remain using
symmetric cryptography. Making changes is thus not so complicated and the performance
of the whole solution is not much worse [30, p. 4].
Basic principle of the operation is as follows: Client inserts his public key and signature
into the pre-authentication items upon request for TGT. AS authenticates the public key
in the request according to a list of trusted certification authorities and set policy. After
successful authentication, AS creates and sends new TGT to the client the above described
way but using different cryptographic keys.
[30, p. 5] defines two possibilities how to encrypt reply for client: Either by using keys
obtained by agreement between KDC and client by Diffie-Hellman (according to RFC 2631
[22]) algorithm, or with symmetric key, which is signed by KDC’s private key and en-
crypted with client’s public key. Data needed for decrypting of the reply are included in
pre-authentication item in the reply.
After receiving reply, client authenticates KDC’s signature, decrypts the reply with the
sent keys and then continues with its operations basically the same way as if there weren’t
any extension.
2.4 Determining the Location of KDCs
Each client has to have information about KDC’s addresses to which it can send requests.
Classic solution uses configuration file, where KDC’s address is included. Other option is
to use DNS SRV entries, with which clients can automatically obtain information about
KDC’s addresses.
DNS Resource Record has the following format [5, p. 2]:
_Service._Proto.Name TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target
Service for KDC is always kerberos. Protocol must always be both udp and tcp, thus
for one KDC both records must exist. Realm must be realm name within the so-called
DNS-style. X.500 names are not permitted.
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Other items have standard meaning according to [5]. It is possible to specify more
KDCs and force choice by round-robin. Other option is to define primary KDC and several
secondary which will be contacted by clients only while the primary is inaccessible.
Automated localization has the risk that the KDC address entries can be counterfeit
by attacker through the insecure DNS system. In order to counterfeit the fake ticket to
client with its known session key, the attacker would have to know both the secret key
of client and server. Without knowing those keys he cannot encrypt reply to client and
ticket correctly. Thus counterfeiting DNS entries with KDC address can cause only Denial
of Service.
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Chapter 3
Kerberized environment and
applications
3.1 Kerberos Infrastructure
In the previous chapter the Kerberos protocol and the way a client can localize KDC was
described. The clients have to have a possibility to contact functional KDC in order to be
able to log in (get TGT) and get tickets to servers. When a client cannot get tickets, he
cannot access the servers requiring authentication, and the whole network becomes unusable
for him in the worst case.
It is strongly recommended to have more KDCs serving each realm in the network for
this reason. Each KDC needs to have access to the principal database with the secret keys
at the same time.
Generally, possibilities of number of KDCs and databases are as follows:
• One KDC can have database saved locally, or can access it remotely, e.g. via LDAP.
• In a configuration with more KDCs there are three basic variants shown in fig. 3.1:
Each KDC has its local database, or all KDCs access to (physically or logically)
common database via LDAP, or each KDC accesses to its own database via LDAP.
In infrastructures with more databases a general problem arises: how to choose place
(i.e. database) for making write and how to synchronize safely the content of the databases.
Protocols for administration and replication are currently not standardized and each im-
plementer has a different approach to this problem.
3.1.1 Replication Principles
Master–slave The first approach is master–slave. Making changes is possible only in the
master KDC database. Then the whole database or individual changes are replicated to the
slave KDC.
In case of master KDC failure, authentication stays functional thanks to the fact that
it is basically a read-only operation (it is only necessary to read the cryptographical keys)
[14, ch. 13.5]. KDC writes to database such information as time of the last login, counter
of unsuccessful attempts, adjustments of principals’ configuration etc. It is often acceptable
to work temporarily without these operations.
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KDC 1
master
DB 1 KDC 2
slave
DB 2
replication
(a) Each KDC with own local DB, replication via kprop.
KDC 1 KDC 2DB
LDAP LDAP
(b) All KDCs on single shared DB.
KDC 1
master
DB 1
KDC 2
slave
DB 2
LDAP LDAP
replication
(c) Each KDC with own external DB. Replication
handled by DB engine.
Figure 3.1: Possible KDC and database configurations.
Another limitation is caused by the delay of changes replications from master to all
slaves. (Clients can send requests for tickets to several different slave KDCs in order to
spread the load [14, ch. 13.5].) The delay is determined especially by set parameters of
replication, or database size and network throughput.
Delay caused by replication can be reduced by using hierarchical replication [18, p. 6]:
Master makes replication to a subset of slave KDCs and then these updated slave KDCs
replicate to another slave subset in parallel etc.
Delay can be further decreased by using often run incremental replication [18, p. 31–
32]. Theoretically, delay can be decreased even more by using push approach when master
immediately sends changes to all slaves.
An example of implementation of the master–slave approach is the MIT KDC. It enables
to use local database and own master–slave synchronisation protocol, which periodically
replicates the whole database (or last changes only) from master KDC to slave KDCs.
The second approach is to use own external database for each KDC, e. g. for MIT
KDC directory server OpenLDAP. Above mentioned characteristics of the master–slave
architecture are preserved, but replication can be done by the directory server. Thus KDC
doesn’t have to use its own replication protocol. It can be convenient when the database is
used for other data, and replication and back-up solution is already in place.
Multi-master The third approach uses multi-master database. Each KDC has its own
database but database engine automatically mutually synchronises writes and solves write
conflicts. From the logical point of view, the whole database acts as a single one. Upon failure
of one KDC the changes can be further made by other KDCs. Multi-master directory server
is typically used here.
Problem of the multi-master approach is that upon multiple simultaneous write an
inconsistency of data can arise. Experience from real operation shows though that incon-
sistencies happen very rarely when suitable protocols are used [19].
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The above described implementation can be found e.g. in the FreeIPA project where
there is MIT KDC with 389 Directory Server database (formerly Fedora Directory Server).
3.2 Applications in Kerberized Environment
Applications requiring authentication usually require also some form of providing of in-
tegrity and/or confidentiality of the transferred data. Kerberos Consortium names three
common ways to use for Kerberos authentication and provide required characteristics of
data transfer [20]:
3.2.1 Raw Kerberos API
The first option is to use the above mentioned support from the Kerberos protocol. On the
other hand, compatibility is problematic while processing messages KRB_SAFE for historical
reasons.
Furthermore, it is necessary to use directly particular API Kerberos implementations,
which usually differ a little. These differences then make it impossible to compile the appli-
cation without further adjustments with different Kerberos implementations. This problem
unfortunately concerns even historically related implementations MIT and Heimdal.
Due to the stated reasons [20, p. 4] doesn’t recommend to use this approach when
making new applications.
3.2.2 Generic Security Service API (GSS-API)
This is general API for security services. It is not bound to particular security technology
and it is designed the way that the programmes can be portable at source-level [16].
It provides services for ensuring authentication, integrity and confidentiality at the mes-
sage level. Individual messages are directly available to the application, there is no virtual
stream created such as by TCP.
It enables GSS-API application to choose a method that should be used for ensuring
security at run-time. Kerberos is typically one of supported methods.
This API is standardized and it is well supported by operating systems. The exception
is especially Microsoft Windows, which offers only proprietary SSPI – Security Support
Provider Interface.1
Because of standardisation and good support in operating systems [20, p. 5] recommends
to use GSS-API while creating new applications. Implementation of stream-oriented services
is not completely straightforward because of message orientation.
3.2.3 Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
It provides a mechanism for negotiation over used method of authentication between com-
municating parties. Unlike GSS-API, it is stream-oriented. It encapsulates GSS-API and
supports Kerberos as well.
[20, p. 6] states that implementations are not yet so mature as with GSS-API, the
standards are still developed. Implementation of stream-oriented applications is noticeably
simpler than while using GSS-API though.
1Support for Kerberos v5 GSS-API can be installed to Microsoft Windows by MIT Kerberos for Windows.
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Chapter 4
MIT Kerberos configuration
Particular commands and procedures for setting configurations mentioned here are given in
[17] and [18]. The following sections introduce concepts and “building blocks” from which
required solution can be configured.
Following text several times refers to development versions of MIT Kerberos. Their are
available at URL svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5. This address provides anonymous access
to the Subversion repository.
4.1 Creating database and realm
An important step before creating realm is a designing of infrastructure, choice of database
and method of replication. These problems are discussed in chapter 3.1.
Original MIT distribution supports two types of databases: Local Kerberos database
and LDAP. Let us assume that decisions about infrastructure have already been done.
In both cases it is necessary to select master password. Master key by which entries
in KDC database are encrypted is derived from it. Encrypting serves as a protection of
backed-up database with keys at theft. That’s why master password/key shouldn’t be a
part of backups [18, p. 23–24].
Upon creating realm the so-called stash file must be created. It contains master key.
This file is used by KDC for decrypting entries in database.
4.1.1 Local Kerberos database
It is stored in a file accessible by KDC. This database is completely independent of software
outside KDC, which is an advantage. Some of the disadvantages are the separate replicating
mechanism, which has to be separately administrated, and support only for master–slave
replication (see subsection 3.1.1).
Database is created by kdb5_util utility [17, p. 55].
4.1.2 Remote database via LDAP
Directory server is used for storing database. The directory server has to have a corre-
sponding scheme (supplied together with MIT Kerberos) configured. Data replication is
completely in charge of directory server. Individual characteristics depend on used server
and its configuration. For example, KDC with 389 Directory Server enables multi-master
data replication.
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Possibility of multi-master replication is an advantage. In environments where directory
server is already used, configuration of separated replication mechanism is not enforced.
More complicated configuration and dependency of KDC on other software is a disadvan-
tage. It is necessary to put more attention to securing of directory server.
LDAP database is administrated by kdb5_ldap_util utility [17, p. 55–58].
4.1.3 Slave KDCs
Configuration of master and slave KDC is practically identical. Difference is in the way
of making changes in database. In case of master–slave architecture administration server1
kadmind is run only on master KDC. In case of multi-master architecture kadmind can be
run on more KDCs. Directory server then maintain synchronization and data consistency.
4.1.4 Other basic configuration of a realm
Further it is necessary to decide the way of configuring clients. Name of realm and KDC
can be configured statically or DNS can be used for distributing information. It is then
necessary to secure DNS well.
Mechanism for localizing KDC was described in section 2.4. [21] standard doesn’t involve
mechanism for finding out realm name from DNS. MIT Kerberos supports translation of
hostname to realm name by querying DNS TXT records [18, pp. 3–4].
Static configuration or enabling to use DNS for looking up records is necessary to be
written into configuration file krb5.conf at clients.
Another option is to use plugin for Kerberos libraries which provides automated config-
uration. This option will be discussed later.
4.2 Principals and passwords administration
Principal database administration is provided by kadmind server and kadmin tool; details
are given in [17, pp. 41–50].
Each principal has a set of attributes which determine its rights and other details of its
behaviour. List of attributes contains common values such as expiration time of account
and password, account enable/disable status (here as a permission to get tickets) and other.
There are several interesting options specific to Kerberos:
• renewable – Permits principal to request tickets, whose validity can be prolonged.
• maxlife – Maximum validity time of one ticket. If ticket is renewable, it can be
prolonged by request to KDC while it is valid.
• maxrenewlife – Maximum length of ticket validity. It is impossible to prolong ticket
after set expiration time.
• policy – Policy with password and account lockout parameters. It will be discussed
later.
• requires_preauth – Authentication of principal against AS requires valid pre-authentication.
It enables to record successful and unsuccessful attempts for authentication.
1This server provides interface for database administration and changing database content.
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• requires_hwauth – Authentication of principal against AS requires valid pre-authentication
by hardware device.
Setting of renewable and lifetimes has an impact on how often one principal has to re-
quest new/renewed ticket when it operates with the same server for a long time. Renewable
permission and setting longer intervals will reduce the load of KDC. A disadvantage is that
time in which stolen ticket can be misused will be prolonged as well.
4.2.1 Password quality checks
Requirements concerning complexity of passwords can be defined by means of the so-called
policies [17, p. 50–51].
Among adjustable parameters there are minimum length of a password, minimum num-
ber of character classes2 in a password, minimum/maximum lifetime of a password and
number of past keys kept for a principal.
Since 1.9 version there is API enabling to write plugins for password quality checking
[10]. The following plugins are built-in: dict (check if the password isn’t in a dictionary),
empty (rejects empty passwords), hesoid (check against items in Hesoid database), princ
(check against principal components).
4.2.2 Principal lockout
Policies also have settings for principal lockout. (This is a relatively new feature added in
version 1.8.3)
Enables to block granting tickets for a period of time to principal whose records show
too many incorrect pre-authentications. (In order to keep lockout policy functional, the
principal must have requires_preauth switched on.)
Adjustable parameters are: A maximum number of attempts before lockout, period after
which bad pre-authentication count will be reset and period in which lockout is enforced.
Lockout policy can be used when implementing security policy. A disadvantage is that
when unsuccessful pre-authentication of client a write to database is made, which reduces
performance. Another serious disadvantage is openness to Denial of Service attacks.
Current implementations make write also in slave KDC. Entries in database of pre-
authentication failures counter and time of last pre-authentication failure/success are not
replicated now. That’s why principal locks on each KDC individually.
In case of lockout policy not being used, updating of these items can be switched off
by disable_last_success and disable_lockout in KDC configuration. It can possibly
improve performance [17, p. 21].
4.2.3 Synchronization with other systems
Since 1.9 release there is an interface for kadmin, which provides hooks for principal creation,
modification and password changing. This enables to create tools for one-way synchroniza-
tion of changes from KDC database to other systems.
For example synchronization of MIT KDC → Microsoft Active Directory is dealt with
by a recent project krb5-adsync, homepage http://code.google.com/p/krb5-adsync/.
2Lower/upper case letters, digits, punctuation, other characters.
3It’s undocumented up to version 1.9.2 (stable). Currently unreleased version 1.10 has this as part of
documentation (SVN revision 25618).
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4.3 Pre-authentication
KDC has a built-in support for two of previously mentioned methods of pre-authentication.
The first is based on using client’s secret key and timestamp, the second supported method
is PKINIT (see subsection 2.3.6).
Other methods can be added using pre-authentication framework. It is based on Flexible
Authentication Secure Tunnelling (FAST), defined by RFC 6113 [9]. A pre-authentication
mechanism which works with the FAST extension is called a FAST factor.
4.3.1 PKINIT
Method is dependent on functional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Particular procedure
of generating certificates and configuring system are given in [7] and [17, p. 32–34]. Con-
figuration is necessary to be done also on client computer where it is necessary to specify
path to certificate of the certification authority and to client’s secret key.
This method enables to log in by smart card or certificate stored on computer instead
of password. An advantage of this method is that it eliminates dependency on potentially
weak password, from which client derives it’s long-term secret key.
A disadvantage is complicated implementation in an environment where there is no PKI
yet.
Anonymous PKINIT In an environment with functional PKINIT it is possible to allow
anonymous login into realm (obtaining TGT). Particular details are described in [6].
There are two variants: Realm exposed anonymous and Completely anonymous.
Realm exposed variant can be used e.g. in case that user of our realm wants to au-
thenticate against external service and doesn’t want to reveal his identity. In that case
external service gets only information that it is an authenticated user of our realm. The
whole principal name will remain hidden.
Completely anonymous is self-descriptive. In this case ticket is issued to anybody and
there is no identity verification. This mode can be used e.g. for host registration. New
machine without host principal logs anonymously and creates its own principal and key.
This mode solves problem of establishing accounts upon deployment of many machines.
Without anonymous authentication it is necessary to create principal of a machine some
other way and then safely transport key to the machine.
4.3.2 One Time Password
Currently there is an experimental version FAST factor OTP plugin. It is based on prepared
standard for Kerberos OTP Pre-authentication [23].
Project WWW: https://www.nordu.net/~linus/INSTALL-krb5-fast-otp.html.
OTP mechanisms solve problem with eavesdropping of pre-authentication and following
brute-force attack against client’s secret key. The standard hasn’t been finished yet and
current implementation is in an experimental stage.
4.4 Cross-realm trust
So far protocol operation was described within one realm. Kerberos protocol supports also
authentication of entities from other realms which trust one another. (It is also possible to
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create one-way trust.) Configuration is described in [17, p. 70].
Typical use is cross-realm trust between Microsoft Windows Active Directory↔MIT/Heimdal
realm. Correctly set trust enables users to authenticate transparently to all servers no mat-
ter if they log in from Windows or other systems.
4.5 Client-side plugins
Some of the plugins described so far were used only for KDC and e.g. support for OTP has
a plugin for both KDC and client. It is possible to create plugins operating only on client.
For example FreeIPA project uses client plugin sssd_krb5_locator. This enables sssd
demon to change dynamically the address of KDC to which library sends requests [25]. This
is used for implementation of fail-over among different KDC on the library level.
When failure of currently active KDC occurs, the fail-over algorithm switches to other
KDC without necessity to write into file krb5.conf.
Plugin thus makes it possible to centralize configuration into file belonging to sssd,
configuration of KDC addresses doesn’t have to be doubled in configuration files of the
library.
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Chapter 5
Possible bottlenecks analysis
In the preceding chapters Kerberos protocol and its various possibilities of configuration
were described. Client’s behaviour in real environment is typically more complicated. It
is necessary to consider behaviour complexly in order to analyze potential bottlenecks,
including taking other details into account, which haven’t been described yet. Figure 5.1
(high-level) summarizes the whole process from initial authentication of client against KDC
to client’s authentication to application server.
Client
DNS servers KDCs with database
Application server
1. Realm name query
2. KDC address query
5. Application server query
3. AS (TGT) request without pre-authentication
4. AS request with pre-authentication and reply
7. Request for application server ticket
6. Authentication method negotiation
8. Authentication with a ticket
Figure 5.1: Example of interaction between one client, DNS server, KDC and application
server. Steps 1–4 are necessary for obtaining initial TGT. Each step contains bi-directional
communication between both involved parties.
If client isn’t configurated statically, it has to find out the name of the realm to which
it belongs and look up addresses of appropriate KDC. Client does it in optional steps 1 and
2 by a query to DNS (described in subsection 2.4).
Client sends request for TGT to AS in step 3. Typical behaviour of today’s client libraries
is that they send request for TGT without pre-authentication item upon the first attempt
(packet capture is in appendix A, pre-authentication was desribed in subsections 2.3.2 and
2.3.6). After receiving the request KDC has to look up record for requested principal in its
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database. If pre-authentication is required, KDC replies with error code PREAUTH_REQUIRED
and a list of permitted pre-authentication methods.
Client reacts to this error by repeating its request and adding data necessary for pre-
authentication. If pre-authentication is successful, KDC sends client new TGT in step 4.
Login time can also be recorded to a database according to KDC’s configuration (see 4.2.2).
In order to be able to start communication with application server, client has to look up
its address. Further, client has to find out FQDN of the application server for correct forming
of service principal. (For Service principal format see figure 2.1, page 5.) Problems arise
typically in cases where user entered only relative domain name etc. Some implementations
use DNS (step 5) for these purposes, details are given in [21, p. 10].
After the beginning of communication with application server, negotiation about used
method of authentication typically follows (it is shown in step 6). Details depend on par-
ticular application protocol. Some real possibilities were described in subsection 3.2. The-
oretically it is possible that client first requests a ticket for application server from KDC
and then starts communication with it. That would mean exchanging steps 6 and 7 or
completely leaving out negotiation, i.e. step 6.
Upon agreement that Kerberos should be used for authentication, client has to request
a ticket for particular application server from TGS. That happens in step 7 by mechanism
described in subsection 2.3.3.
The last step is the authentication of client against application server by mechanism
described in 2.3.4. Some details depend on application, for example mutual authentication
is optional.
During the whole process individual DNS queries and requests to KDC can be sent to
different servers, potentially located in different parts of network. Particular behaviour is
dependent on implementation.
There are many points in the authentication process that can prove to be bottlenecks.
They can be divided into four areas: Network environment, Client side, Server side and
KDC.
5.1 Network environment
The whole system is dependent on functional name translation, typically by using DNS.
Waiting time for result of DNS query increases whole latency upon authentication. If used
implementation uses DNS for translation of given name to FQDN, number of necessary
queries will be even higher1. Impact of DNS in particular cases depends also on DNS cache
settings at clients’ etc.
Communication between client, DNS and KDC typically uses UDP. If request is bigger
than set limit, client creates TCP connection to server with both protocols. Communication
protocol between client and application server depends on application.
It was found out by experiment that UDP packets with requests sent to KDC have
size of approximately 200–400 B. Size of packet with PREAUTH_REQUIRED error is within the
same borders. Replies from KDC containing ticket have a typical size of 700–900 B. Packet
captures are in appendix A.
If PKINIT extension is used (described in subsection 2.3.6), TCP connection is made
in step 4 and both request and reply has size of approximately 2–4 kB.
1So-called Name Canonization by means of DNS makes it possible to attack the system by insecure DNS
[21, p. 10]. Further problems may arise in cases when forward and reverse DNS records do not match.
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The whole network environment must be appropriately dimensioned. Substantial traffic
on DNS and individual KDCs can be expected in larger networks. Hypothetically, bottle-
necks can be caused by stateful firewall/IDS/IPS systems on the way between clients and
KDC.
5.2 Client side
Let us assume that client is used as a common PC. User logs in (gets TGT) and then
obtains several service tickets for services used by him. Then he doesn’t need to interact
with Kerberos infrastracture for most time, or it requests new service ticket once in a long
time (by mechanism described in subsection 2.3.3).
In the described case there aren’t big requirements of client. Cryptography and commu-
nication takes place seldom and symmetric cryptography of data with size of several kB is
almost unobservable to users. From user’s point of view latency, which can arise e.g. upon
problems with DNS, can be inconvenient.
In special applications (for example using one-chip microcomputers as clients) time
necessary for cryptography may be significant, see e.g. [24, p. 10]. These most specific cases
won’t be further examined.
From the above stated it is obvious that neither computing nor commumicating require-
ments should cause bottleneck under common circumstances.
Applications usually don’t use Kerberos protocol directly, they use some of the libraries
(see 3.2). Hypothetically, bottlenecks can be caused on client’s side by non-optimal imple-
mentation or inappropriate using of libraries or also by application protocol characteristic.
Relatively demanding can be e.g. authentication by means of Kerberos within HTTP, as
it will be described later. It is not expected though that it could cause problems on the
client’s side upon common use of HTTP.
Problems can also be caused by incorrect configuration of client. For example if there is a
non-existing or non-functional DNS server or KDC is set as primary. Incorrect configuration
of IPv6 stack, where client tries to communicate via incorrect IPv6 address, has similar
impact. In these cases implementations typically make fail-over to another DNS server or
KDC, or alternatively try to communicate via IPv4. It depends on implementation whether
waiting for timeout has impact only on the first request or on each.
5.3 Server side
As it is obvious from the previous description of Client – Server Authentication (see sub-
section 2.3.4), server gets all information necessary for authentication directly from client
and basically doesn’t have to communicate further via network.
Each authentication includes minimum of two operations of decrypting with symmetric
algorithm. In case where mutual authentication and/or using of sub-session key is required,
server has to make an (optional) operation of key generation and encrypting with symmetric
algorithm.
Frequency of authentication depends on application protocol. Typically client uses ob-
tained service ticket upon repeated authentications, it doesn’t have to request a new ticket
for each request from KDC.
Rather extreme case is HTTP where authentication by means of AP_REQ message is
done upon each request [12, p. 4]. (Packet capture is in appendix A.) This inconvenient
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characteristic can be partially avoided by using method described in [2].
Another problem of Kerberos implementation into HTTP is securing transferred data
against modification which is necessary to solve by SSL/TLS. Establishing TLS connection
can add another significant overhead.
Generally, bottleneck can be caused upon frequent authentication because of server’s
insufficient performance. As it was demonstrated on the HTTP example, particular demands
depend on implementation of application protocol.
5.4 Key Distribution Centre
All requests for issuing tickets from the whole realm are processed on several KDCs. Op-
eration of ticket issuing (described in subsection 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) includes decrypting of
received request2, session key generation and twice encrypting operation. If PKINIT exten-
sion is used, some cryptographic operations on KDC are realized by asymmetric algorithms
which can be substantially more demanding as to computational performance than sym-
metric algorithms.
KDC has to have sufficient computational performance to be able to make required
encrypting/decrypting in real time. Also, key generation operation is very frequent and
hypothetically a generator (source) of random numbers could be a bottleneck. Further
information about random number generation can be found in [3].
Processing time of requests is further increased by unavoidable accesses to principal
database. Database operations include not only reading keys and settings for each principal
(see section 4.2), but also recording changes.
Changes are made not only upon less common operations such as password changing or
upon principal adding but also optionally upon each successful or unsuccessful login. Login
time or number of unsuccessful attempts are recorded then (see subsection 4.2.2).
Each operation of database reading blocks KDC because without knowing cryptographic
keys and parameters it cannot continue with issuing ticket. MIT implementation of KDC
was only single-thread up to the version 1.8 and it didn’t offer the possibility of paralel-
lization. From the version 1.9 on this problem is solved by multi-process worker model
[11].
5.5 Summary
These potential problems which can cause bottlenecks were identified:
• Network environment
– Network latency
– Firewall/IDS/IPS throughput
– DNS throughput
• Client side
– Improper configuration
– Application protocol
– Library implementation/usage
• Server side
– Computational performance
– Application protocol
• KDC
– Database access
– Computational performance
– Source of randomness
2Issuing TGT in cases where pre-authentication is not required is an exception.
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Chapter 6
Performance test suite design and
implementation
In the previous chapter there were many various factors identified that could have impact
on performance of authentication solutions using Kerberos. Thus proposed test framework
should be as flexible as possible.
It is necessary to consider the fact that environments with deployed Kerberos are dis-
tributed in principle (more DNS servers, KDCs, optionally separate databases). Influence
of network environment may be one of potential problems.
For this reason framework has to enable distributed testing, which will make it possible
to test system performance in real environment. Distributed testing enables to avoid errors
caused by inadequate simulations and to adjust the test more easily to particular conditions
and requirements.
Other requirements are simple installation, easy usability of ready-made tests and easy
writing of new tests with preservation of maximum flexibility. Individual tests should be in
the form of independent plugins, so that it is possible to combine them conveniently.
6.1 Distributed test model
Suggested model of distributed test is in fig. 6.1. Distributed test can consist of more
single-purpose tests that can run in parallel. For example requests for TGT can be generated
(one single-purpose test) together with authentication via Kerberos/HTTP (another single-
purpose test).
Distributed test as a whole will be called test in the following text, plugin will be used
for individual single-purpose tests in order to distinguish between them.
Each plugin is divided into two components, the so-called slave and master, in order to
simplify plugin writing and improve scalability.
Slave component interacts with tested system, for example it generates requests for au-
thentication. Slave operation is controlled by superior master component. Slave can contact
its superior component also in an asynchronous way, which is convenient for error handling
etc.
Master component controls generally n identical slaves, coordinates their operations,
provides high-level interface for controlling group of slaves and also transfers result data, if
plugin produces some.
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Plugin 1
Master
Plugin 1
. . . slaves . . .
Plugin 1
Slave 1
Plugin 1
Slave n
Distributed test
configuration
Plugin 2
Master
Plugin 2
. . . slaves . . .
Plugin 2
Slave 1
Plugin 2
Slave n
Tested system
Figure 6.1: Proposed distributed test model with example of two plugins (single-purpose
tests). It doesn’t display controlling of individual master components and implementation
details. The arrow goes from communication initiator.
In the testing system there is also configuration object present, which contains configura-
tion of the whole environment. Master components may ask for information on current test
configuration and control its progress according to it. Masters can mutually communicate
bi-directionally, which enables to coordinate operation of individual plugins.
Model doesn’t limit distribution of components among machines (hosts), there can gen-
erally be any distribution. They can all be started on one machine or each on a different
machine.
Proposed division into masters, slaves, and configuration enables to separate effectively
test control from its operation part. In case overload of some slaves happens, e.g. because
of unsuitably set parameters, there is still a high-level control that enables to stop the test
on machines that are (still) able to react.
High-level control could theoretically be centralized in one component. Strict division of
controlling part for each plugin into individual master component makes it easier to create
new plugins and improves repeated usability of components.
Further, individual masters can be distributed to more machines, which should enable
to make tests in large scale. This is significant especially in cases when it is necessary to do
pre/post-processing of data. If there is a bottleneck on configuration object, there shouldn’t
be a problem to replicate it, either.
All components are fully accessible, so anyone can communicate with anyone if it is
necessary. This characteristic shouldn’t be directly used within the presented framework,
master–slave hierarchy should be kept. Overall openness is useful especially in special cases
such as debugging of complicated tests or test framework itself.
6.2 Test framework model
For implementation of the suggested testing model, it is necessary to solve controling of
individual components, loading configuration and user interface. Because of this, distributed
test model is further extended by Loader and Console components.
Loader controls components on one host. It carries out loading of components upon
request and it can terminate them.
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Console provides high-level interface for communication between user and test frame-
work. It enables to load configuration to configuration object, start and stop defined tests
and also collect results provided by individual plugins.
Host 1
Loader
Master 1
Slave 1
Slave 2
Host 3
Console
Host 2
Loader
Configuration
Master 2
Slave 2
1
3
4
1
2
3
4
4
Figure 6.2: Framework model including controlling Console and Loader components. Num-
bers identify phases in which communication proceeds: 1st loading of components; 2nd
loading of configuration; 3rd command to start testing; 4th command transfer to slave
components. Communication master → configuration object is not shown in order to make
the figure clearer.
Figure 6.2 shows real example of component distribution and individual phases before
starting the test, in which communication takes place.
User has to define parameters of the test first: What components, what parameters and
on what machines the test will be run. Console takes the following steps after its launching:
1. It contacts loaders and using them it launches configuration object and other required
components.
2. It fills configuration object with user configuration, so that it is accessible to all running
components.
3. It sends start command to all masters in order to start test.
4. Masters send start command to their subordinate slaves. The test is launched this
way.
6.3 Test framework implementation
According to suggested models test framework in Python language using Pyro4 library
(Python Remote Objects) was implemented. Pyro library provides general remote procedure
call. Each component of test framework is implemented as an individual object, which
communicates with other according to a model described in two preceding subsections.
For implementation reasons there is Name Server present in the framework, which is
used for translating component names (i.e. Python objects) to URL (Uniform Resource
Locator). Before communication starts between two objects, object name is translated to
URL, which contains information necessary for communication. URL is saved and transla-
tion is not repeated within one test, so that there is no useless increasing of communication
latency.
Besides initial translation of names communication takes place according to fig. 6.2: On
each host machine LoaderDaemon is run, which loads other system components on-demand.
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Each component is run in an individual process, which avoids problem of the so-called Big
Interpreter Lock in some Python implementations.
Framework supports parametrizable plugins in order to simplify its use. Particular plu-
gin configuration is called instance. Thus, there is a hierarchy of three terms:
• Test The whole distributed test comprising generally several single-purpose tests.
• Plugin Single-purpose test which can generally be parametrizable. For example, it
can be a plugin sending requests for TGT. Required parameter is principal and its
secret cryptographic key. This term plugin includes both master and slave component.
• Instance Particular configuration of plugin, e.g. requesting for TGT for admin@REALM
principal using particular cryptographic key. Instance can be generally run on n slaves.
It requires one master component belonging to particular instance for controlling all
slaves.
6.4 Test plugins implementation
Several test plugins were implemented: Two multi-purpose plugins Ping and Procloop were
implemented. Other two plugins focused on authentication are KrbV and PAM. Documenta-
tion and configuration examples are on DVD, see appendix A.
Ping This plugin is an equivalent of classical network ping. The plugin is useful as a test
tool during test suite provisioning. It can be used during real distributed test for network
latency monitoring. One “ping” is realized as one remote call from slave to master. Minimal,
maximal and average ping latency is measured and reported.
Procloop – “Process loop” The plugin runs specified command in an infinite loop. This
functionality can be used as a workaround for authentication methods without appropriate
plugin. Generally, usage of this plugin for performance testing should be avoided if possible.
Overhead added by forking can be significant. This plugin does not return any results.
KrbV – “Kerberos V” KrbV is a fundamental plugin of the described performance
test suite. It requests TGTs for specified principals as fast as possible.
The plugin accepts list of principals with their cryptographic keys. Requests order is
configurable. TGTs can be requested in the same order as stated in principal list or in
random order. It can be useful during database tests.
Number of obtained TGTs and time spent on Kerberos calls are measured and reported.
Results are available for each slave separately and also in a summarized form.
Python Kerberos library KrbV is used in this plugin. This library is very simple wrapper
around native Kerberos library in an operating system. Overhead of Kerberos calls should
be minimal.
PAM – “Pluggable Authentication Modules” Last implemented plugin is a proof-of-
concept support for Pluggable Authentication Modules authentication system. This plugin
allows to test any authentication method which has a PAM module.
It is limited to authentication by user name and password, other authentication options
are not supported. Reporting features are same as for KrbV plugin.
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6.5 Test suite provisioning
While provisioning it is necessary to take the following steps:
0. configuration of hosts and servers
1. test suite installation
2. configuration of Pyro Name Server and Plugin Loaders
Before running the test it is necessary to:
3. create test configuration
4. distribute data which need used plugins (unless they are part of their configuration)
Configuring hosts Further text supposes functional network environment and host name
translation (using /etc/hosts is possible).
Server settings depend on requirements of tested environment, test framework doesn’t
have specific demands on application servers. KDC configuration is described in detail in
[17] and [18].
Framework components have to communicate mutually and with Pyro Name Server. As
ports on which communication takes place change dynamically, I recommend not to limit
communication among present hosts.
Test Suite Installation Framework itself requires the following Python packages: pyro
(version 4.9 or higher), daemon and yaml (PyYAML). For Kerberos plugins KrbV package
is required. Installation files are on the attached DVD. See appendix A for list of files and
their description.
If you use Fedora 16 distribution or newer, use the RPM package. It ensures installa-
tion of required dependencies. Please use command yum localinstall PTS-1-1.rpm for
installation.
Alternatively it is possible to install by Python distutils. First extract file PTS-1-1.tar.gz
and then run python setup.py install as root.
Console program is named ptstest.py. PyDist and RPM package will install this
program to path /usr/bin. Please see documentation in appendix A.
Test Suite Configuration The whole framework uses Pyro4 library for communica-
tion, which is configured by environment variables. Basic setting is done by attached RPM
package.
In case of manual installation I recommend to edit commented sample configuration file
PTS.env and then load it into environment.
The most important is PYRO_HOST variable: It must be set to hostname which is re-
solvable to an IP address on some local interface. I recommend to set communication
timeout (variable PYRO_COMMTIMEOUT) to reasonable value, e.g. 60 seconds. It allows to de-
tect dead connections and prevents from undefinite blocking. Further it is convenient to
set PYRO_NS_HOST variable to domain name of Pyro Name Server. It disables broadcast
autodetection mechanism.
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Single host in network must run Pyro Name Server. It can be started with systemctl
start PyroNameServer.service command. If you didn’t use RPM for installation, please
use command python -m Pyro4.naming.
All hosts participating in test have to run Loader Daemon. It can be started with
command systemctl start PTSLoaderDaemon.service. Alternatively it can be started
with python -m PTS.LoaderDaemon.
6.6 Test configuration
Configuration has to be stored on host on which Console runs. From host with Console it
will be loaded to Configuration Object on selected host.
It is stored in three files in YAML (“YAML Ain’t Markup Language”, standardized by
[1]) format. Commented example files for particular tests are provided on the DVD, see
appendix A.
server-host.map This file defines host name on which Configuration Object/Server
will be run. It should contain only a single line. Expected format is:
config: hostname
instance-config.map There are details about Plugin Instances configuration stored
in this file. Specified instance configuration can be assigned to hosts, as will be described
later. Expected format is:
plugin_instance_name:
plugin: PluginModule # Python module with plugin’s classes
slave_class: PluginSlave # slave component’s class name
slave_params: anything_in_YAML # plugin dependent
master_class: PluginMaster # master component’s class name
master_params: anything_in_YAML # plugin dependent
master_host: hostname # on which host will be master component run
Any part except instance name can be omitted. Default (derived) values are:
Parameter Default value
plugin If plugin_instance_name contains hash sign (#), then part of in-
stance name before the hash will become a plugin. If instance name
doesn’t contain hash, the whole name will become a plugin.
slave class
master class
Slave and Master class names will be constructed as concatenation
of plugin name and string Slave or Master, respectively.
slave params
master params
Slave and Master constructor parameters default to empty dictionary
– no user parameters will be passed to constructor.
master host Master components will be run on the same host as Configuration
Object/Server does.
Besides YAML standard notation application-specific local tag !file may also be used.
It reads content of specified file and replaces itself with this content.
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Instace configuration worked example
KrbV#1: # instance name
slave_params:
granularity: 5 # collect data each 5 seconds
principal_list: # authenticate as these principals
- principal: test@LOCAL
keytab: !file /tmp/test.keytab # keytab value will contain binary
- principal: test2@LOCAL # data as they were read from file
keytab: !file /tmp/test2.keytab
master_host: virtgw # can be omitted
slavehost-instance.map The puporse of this file is to assign slave components of
one or more plugin instances to specified host. It is possible to run multiple copies of slave
component on the same host. Expected format is:
host1: &saveName # & operator saves host configuration for later reference
FirstInstanceName: 12 # save/reference operators are optional
SecondInstanceName: 5 # how many instances will be started on given host
host2: *saveName # host2 will use same configuration as host1
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Chapter 7
Evaluation of implemented test
suite
Implemented test suite was used for performance testing on various MIT Kerberos config-
urations. Individual tests were run from simple configurations of MIT Kerberos and tests
to more complicated.
Tests were conducted on latest stable versions of MIT KDCs. The first experiments
were conducted on versions from 1.9.x series. Values in further text were measured on
stable version 1.10.1.
Basic test scenario contains only a single client and a single KDC with default configu-
rations. Other tests are modifications of it.
• One client sends requests for TGT to a single KDC.
• Client is statically configured with KDC’s address. KDC address lookup through DNS
is not enabled by default.
• KDC has default configuration, KDC’s database is stored locally in DB2 database
engine.
• Database has default configuration. All successful and unsuccessful authentications
are recorded.
• Database is filled with 10 000 new principals. Each principal has requires_preauth
enabled “for security reasons” (see subsection 2.3.6).
Test systems configuration
Client
Component Description
CPU Intel Xeon 5110 @ 1.60GHz (2 cores)
Operating memory 4 GB, DDR2, 667 MHz
Operating system Fedora 16 x86_64
KDC
Component Description
CPU Intel Core i7-2620M @ 2.70GHz (1 core enabled)
Operating memory 1 GB, DDR3, 1 333 MHz
Operating system Fedora 16 x86_64 inside KVM
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Test suite was used on 28 different configurations. Moreover, other configurations were
tested during test suite development. Further text describes only important configurations.
Selected configurations are important for understanding of the selected approach or they
regard to some performace problem. The most important values in tables and text are
highlighted.
Original measured data are on attached DVD, see appendix A.
Scenario 1: Default configuration with pre-authentication: TGT for single ran-
domly picked principal was requested in a loop. (KrbV test plugin was used.) Client and
KDC CPU load was < 10 %, but KDC did a lot of writes to disk. System with KDC spent
approximately 30 % of time in Input/Output operations.
TGT issue rate was only 16 TGTs/sec. Standard deviation of measured values was
< 10 %. Observed number of authentications per second is surprisingly low. Apparently
single client (i.e. thread which requests TGTs) is not able to load KDC fully.
Scenario 2: Default configuration with pre-authentication, 10 clients: The test
was conducted the same way as the previous one, but in this case 10 client processes sent
TGT requests for the same principal in parallel.
In this scenario the limiting factor is KDC performance. KDC spent > 90 % of time
for Input/Output operations. I estimate that performance degradation is caused by
writing last login time to database. The next scenario will test this hypothesis.
TGT issue rate didn’t rise proportionally to KDC’s load. Observed poor performance
was consulted on Kerberos Developers Mailing List. Discussion is available on-line at http:
//mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2012-May/010839.html. The reason for poor
performance in this case is most probably global database lock, which is in use on
DB2 databases [29].
Standard deviation of measured values is relatively big. I assume that it is caused by
high write activity which has big demands on underlying file system and buffering system.
TGT issue rate only 26 TGT/sec KDC load ∼ 100 %
Standard deviation < 13 % Client load < 60 %
Table 7.1: Summary of scenario 2.
Scenario 3: With pre-authentication, without last login timestamps, 10 clients:
Default KDC configuration was modified with this: Parameter last_success was set to
false. It disables writing of last login timestamp to database. Other parameters were
unchanged. Number of clients stays the same as in the previous test.
In this case the limiting factor is client’s performance. It is a very surprising, unexpected
problem. As it is obvious from the protocol description in subsection 2.3.2, client has to do
fewer cryptographic operations than KDC and doesn’t have to access any database.
Further investigation identified performance problem inside Kerberos client
libraries in Fedora 16 and 17. Problem is not present in upstream version of client
libraries. It is caused by patch which adds support for Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux)
in Fedora distribution. This problem does not affect KDC itself, only the client side.
The problem was reported to Fedora package maintainer. Status of this bug can be
checked on-line at https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=819115.
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TGT issue rate only 72 TGT/sec KDC load < 10 %
Standard deviation < 9 % Client load ∼ 100 %
Table 7.2: Summary of scenario 3.
Scenario 4: With pre-authentication, without last login timestamps, without
SELinux patch, 10 clients: Patch for SELinux support was removed and Kerberos
client libraries were recompiled. Later it was proved that disabling SELinux is enough to
eliminate performance degradation. The same test as in the previous scenario was repeated.
This scenario higlighted another problem, now regarding KDC. Please see figure 7.1 and
table 7.3. KDC performance drops rapidly.
The cause of this problem is the KDC Lookaside Cache. It is a data structure
which holds requests received by KDC and the respective replies. In this structure all queries
received in the last 120 seconds are stored. It should reduce the load on KDC in case of
re-transmitted requests. In that case KDC can resend remembered reply to original request.
It can also help to protect KDC against some cryptography attacks [28].
The main problem is implementation of this idea. In the current KDC it is implemented
with a simple linked list. This list has to be gone through for each of received requests.
Single search operation on linked-list has time complexity O(n), which is unacceptable
during request processing.
This problem was discussed on Kerberos Developers Mailing List, discussion is avail-
able on-line at http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2012-April/010729.html.
Several improvements were proposed and some patches exist already.
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Figure 7.1: KDC lookaside cache performance impact. Cache stores all requests received in
the last 120 seconds.
Scenario 5: With pre-authentication, without last login timestamps, SELinux
patch and Lookaside cache, 10 clients: In order to be able to continue with measuring
performance characteristics of other KDC components, KDC lookaside cache was disabled
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Dropping rapidly from
TGT issue rate 1 029 to 102 TGT/sec, KDC load ∼ 100 %
stabilizes on 145 TGT/sec
Standard deviation < 5 % (between sucessive runs) Client load < 8 %
Table 7.3: Summary of scenario 4.
in this and all forthcoming tests. KDC was recompiled from source code and installed in
place of original KDC. Then test from scenario 4 was repeated.
TGT issue rate 2 800 TGT/sec KDC load ∼ 100 %
Standard deviation < 5 % Client load < 10 %
Table 7.4: Summary of scenario 5.
Other scenarios with DB2 database: Further performance improvement can be gained
by disabling pre-authentication. In that case TGT issue rate was approximately 4 600
TGT/second on given hardware configuration. (At this value computational performance
on KDC is the limiting factor.) Unfortunately this choice can have security impact, as was
discussed in subsection 2.3.6.
Database locking aspect was analyzed further. Descibed tests were repeated with dif-
ferent list of principals. Insted of single principal there was a list of 1 000 randomly picked
principals used. Observed differences in performance were lower than 4 %. It confirms in-
formation from [29].
Impact of KDC Workers [11] was examined also. Observed differences in performance
were lower than 3 % on DB2 backend.
LDAP database scenarios: Similar tests were conducted with OpenLDAP version
2.4.26-6.fc16 as KDC database backend. LDAP server was on the same host as KDC.
Database with 10 000 principals was created the same way as in DB2 case. LDAP back-
end is not expected to have global lock as DB2 database does [8]. Tests were constructed
with list of 1 000 randomly picked principals for this reason. (Measured data from initial
experiments with single principal can be found in appendix A.)
One of LDAP backend pitfalls is creating database indexes. KDC was able to issue only
five TGTs per second when LDAP attribute krbPrincipalName wasn’t indexed properly.
All CPU time was spent on database operations in that case.
Other results are summarized in table 7.5. SELinux patch and Lookaside Cache impact
is not listed again. These problems affect system operation before accessing a database.
KDC Worker model (as described in [11]) performs well in tests if KDC writes to a
LDAP database often. I assume that workers help because of processing of LDAP query
which modifies data is slower than processing read only queries. These results are not so
representative because parallelism in testing environment was limited.
7.1 Summary
Hypotheses from chapter 5 “Possible bottlenecks analysis” were tested using implemented
test suite.
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Login Pre-authentication Number of TGT Standard
timestamp Workers issue rate deviation
Write Required Disabled 50/sec < 23 %
Write Required 10 98/sec < 18 %
Don’t write Required Disabled 263/sec < 12 %
Don’t write Required 10 241/sec < 5 %
Don’t write Not Required Disabled 529/sec < 5 %
Don’t write Not Required 10 478/sec < 5 %
Table 7.5: Performance data obtained from KDC with LDAP database backend. Behaviour
from pre-1.9 KDC was used when “Number of Workers” is listed as “Disabled”.
Both foreseen bottlenecks on KDC were proven experimentally: If writes to a database
occur frequently, then weak point is database access. In case of LDAP databases reads can
slow down KDC operation also. Computational performance becomes a weak point of KDC
in situations where database is not a limiting factor. Unexpected performance problem in
KDC is caused by KDC Lookaside Cache. Problem was discussed on Kerberos Developers
Mailing List and solutions to this problem were proposed.
On client side a surprising problem was found: In Fedora distribution custom patch
to client libraries exists. This patch slows down client library operation approximately 30-
times. This problem was reported to Fedora library maintainer.
Usefulness of implemented test suite was shown on above mentioned cases.
None of expected bottlenecks in network environment were detected. Testing environ-
ment was limited in scope, so ability to detect this kind of problems was limited also. Testing
in real environment can reveal unobserved problems.
Problems which may arise on server side are dependant mainly on properties of partic-
ular application protocol. Application protocols testing is outside the scope of this work.
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Chapter 8
Possible improvements
Ability to extend this test suite is fundamental requirement for it’s usefulness. Test frame-
work was designed as flexible as possible. Following text summarizes basic information and
best practices for writing new tests. Virtually any part of plugin or framework can be mod-
ified for given puporse. If you are in doubt, please consult developer documentation on
DVD.
8.1 Developing a new test plugin
Developer documentation can be found on DVD, see appendix A. Unless plugin has spe-
cial requirements, it is not necessary to use Pyro library directly, because Test framework
encapsulates all communication. I recommend to get acquainted with Pyro library version
4 [13], especially with asynchronous calls, callbacks and exception handling.
While creating plugins I recommend to inspire from existing plugins. For example “Ping”
is a very simple teaching plugin.
Basic recommended process of creation is as follows:
1. Create new Python module in PTS.Plugins package. I recommend to use module
name the same as plugin name. All plugin classes should be stored inside this single
module.
2. Create new Slave class and inherit from PTS.Plugins.Base.SlaveBase. Implement
all abstract methods.
3. Create new Result class and inherit from PTS.Plugins.Base.ResultBase (or similar
result class from other plugin).
4. Create new Master class and inherit from PTS.Plugins.Base.MasterBase. Imple-
ment all abstract methods. Result processing will be heavily dependant on imple-
mented result classes.
8.1.1 Slave component
Slave class (component) has only four obligatory methods, which have to be re-implemented
in a new plugin: Constructor method __init__ and parameter-less methods start, stop
and kill.
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Constructor has to prepare all necessary data, result structures and environment for
particular test plugin instance, but does not start real test. If any error occurs, exception
should be raised.
Obligatory constructor’s parameters are _daemon, _ns, _inst_name, _sid: These pa-
rameters are provided on run-time by framework and should be passed to parent’s class
(SlaveBase) constructor without any change. SlaveBase’s constructor will set up communi-
cation utilities and register plugin instance to Pyro Name Server. Programmer can add any
number of his own parameters to constructor. They will be read from value slave_params
in configuration file instance-config.map and passed to constructor without any change.
Each instance runs in its own Python process and is allowed to spawn new threads and
also child processes. Managing these resources is on programmer’s responsibility. Recom-
mended way is to set all new threads and processes as “daemonic”, so they will be termi-
nated automatically when main thread terminates. Best practice is to start all threads and
processes in constructor and let them wait for some kind of test start signal (e.g. shared
Event or Condition instance).
Method start() has to start real test as fast as possible and then return. Intended
use is to generate “start event”, which is awaited by waiting threads or processes. It is
not allowed to block in this method during the running test. If Result class provided by
framework is used, then start() method has to call record_start_index() method on
each result object. Result handling details will be described further in the text.
Method stop() has to gracefully stop real test as fast as possible and then return.
Intended use is to negate “loop condition”, which is checked by executive threads or pro-
cesses. Results should be stored for later processing, no time-consuming post-processing is
allowed. It is not allowed to block in this method.
Last obligatory method is kill(). It has to stop all activities immediately, kill all child
threads and processes and as last step unregister and terminate whole plugin. All resources
should be released, including results. In case of errors method should stop and release as
much resources as possible, giving up on first error is not a good approach.
Standard control flow is (in order as methods are called by superior component):
__init__() → start() → stop() → get_results() (inherited from SlaveBase) →
kill(). Method kill() can be called anytime, including error handling situations. If in-
stance refuses to communicate or terminate itself after request, it’s process can be killed
directly by superior component (i.e. without calling instance’s kill() method).
Exceptions raised during remote invocations (i.e. when one object calls methods in
another Pyro component) are normally re-raised on remote side. E.g. if master calls slave’s
method slave.fail() and exception is raised inside method fail(), exception will be
raised in master’s code. It allows to catch exceptions raised from slave in master’s code and
react to them.
Described re-raising of exceptions is standard Pyro behaviour, but this paradigm is not
applicable for methods which weren’t called remotely, e.g. inside code which runs inside sep-
arate thread or process. For these situations framework provides Python Context Manager
class SlaveCM. If any unhandled exception occurs inside block wrapped to with statement,
exception is sent to master’s method _handle_remote_exception(). It allows to report
errors asynchronously and to stop test.
In control flow description there was get_results() method mentioned. In usual cases
this method is inherited from SlaveBase and just returns internal self.results dictionary.
This dictionary should contain individual named Result objects, as will be described further
in the text. If this behaviour is inadequate, this method can be re-implemented.
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8.1.2 Result handling – Result class
Single plugin can create more than one result, each result has its own name (arbitrary
string). Result data format is not limited in any way, any binary data can be returned.
After the end of the test Console will write each result to separate file named “instance
name/result name”.
Each specific result should be implemented as stand-alone class. The framework con-
tains foundation class ResultBase in PTS.Plugins.Base package. It uses user-supplied
index function to mark each value with index. All values which have index in interval de-
fined by granularity parameter are summarized to so-called result frames. Data format and
processing is dependent fully on programmer.
Worked example We want to obtain information how many authentications can be
done in one second during distributed test and what is average authentication latency.
It implicates that one result frame will summarize data about all authentications in one
second, i.e. number of authentications and authentication latency. As we want to sumarize
data per second, index function will be time() and granularity will be one second.
At the beginning of the test current value of index function (i.e. actual time) will
be stored and new empty result frame will be created. Result frame in our case will be
structure which contains items authentication_count and authentication_time_sum,
both initialized to zero.
After each authentication, number one will be added to total count of authentications
and time which authetication took will be added to time sum. For this purpose our imagi-
nary Result class has add_value method.
Add_value method checks if current value of index function time() is still lower than
the sum of index initial value (remembered at the beginning of the test) plus specified
granularity. If it is, new values are just added to current result frame.
Otherwise current result frame is appended to closed result frame list, new frame is
constructed and values are added to this new frame. As a part of creating new result frame
the remembered initial value of index function is overwriten with current value.
After 3.5 seconds of the test there will be four result frames: Three of them will be in
closed result frame list. They contain summarized values from time intervals 〈0, 1), 〈1, 2)
and 〈2, 3). The last frame will contain values from interval 〈3, 4), but it is not complete
now.
Now that we know what index function and result frame mean, writing of new Result
class can be descibed. In ResultBase class there are five abstract methods which have to
be implemented: new_frame, add_value, reduce_frame and reduce_result. Constructor
and other methods can usually be left unmodified.
Inherited constructor __init__ takes two parameters: Index function and granular-
ity. Index function has to be callable without parameters (as time() from package time
is). Return value of index function has to implement comparison and arithmetic methods
compatible with the type used in granularity parameter.
Parameter-less new_frame() method has to construct and return new initialized result
frame. Frame can be an arbitrary object, it is fully programmer’s choice. Typically it is
a dictionary with pre-created values. E.g. in previous authentication example it can be
dictionary {’authentication_count’: 0, ’authentication_time_sum’: 0}.
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Add_value() method takes user-provided values and summarizes them to actual result
frame, which is represented by self.sample_frame object. Method interface and parameter
format is fully programmer’s choice. It has to call inherited auxiliary _rotate_frame()
method in the first step to trigger frame rotation.
Other steps depend on chosen data format. E.g. in our example it can have interface
add_value(time_took). It will call _rotate_frame as the first step. In the second step it
will increment self.sample_frame[’authentication_count’] by number one. It will add
parameter value time_took to self.sample_frame[’authentication_time_sum’] as the
last step.
Method should be as fast as possible, because it is usually called very frequently. Any
post-processing should not be done inside this method.
Purpose of the next two methods is to combine multiple results to a single one. It is a
necessary step when the same instance has multiple slaves and combined result is required.
Reduce_frame() method has to take take exactly two frames and return new frame
filled with summarized data. In our example it will just add values from both input frames.
The second reduction method is reduce_result(). Similarly to reduce_frame() it has
to take take exactly two Result objects and return new Result object filled with summarized
data. It controls reduction on higher-level. It decides which frames have to be reduced and
then calls reduce_frame() on them.
In the presented example it simply picks one frame from both Result objets and calls
reduce_frame() on them. Resulting frame will be stored inside new reduced Result object.
Please note that result methods will be never called if there is only single result (i.e.
plugin instance has only a single slave).
The last necessary method is __str__(). It converts data from result object to a form
appropriate for output. Result value from this method can be arbitrary binary data (don’t
get confused by method’s name str). Returned data will be stored to file by Console.
This method is also the right one to compute summary data. E.g. in the preceding
example it computes average authentication latency from time sum and authentication
count.
8.1.3 Master component
High-level control logic is concentrated in plugin’s master component. Complexity of im-
plementation heavily depends on particular requirements. In most simple cases only single
get_results() method has to be implemented. Other methods can be inherited from class
PTS.Plugins.Base.MasterBase.
Master has to provide all methods mentioned in the description of Slave component,
i.e. __init__, start(), stop(), kill() and get_results(). All constraints for Slave’s
methods are valid also in Master. Detailed description of these methods and constraints is
in subsection 8.1.1.
Default methods start() and stop() provide simple “forward” behaviour. When Con-
sole calls method start() in master, then master calls method start() in all slaves in
parallel. Master’s method returns when all slave calls returns. Any exceptions are propa-
gated back to caller (usually Console). Same behaviour applies to stop().
Default kill() method shares “forward” behaviour as described. The difference is in
error handling: If any exception occurs, it is logged and kill() method continues.
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Each master component has to implement get_results() method. It has to return
dictionary with pairs (result name, binary data as Python string). Insted of binary data
any object implementing __str__() method can be provided.
Class MasterBase contains auxiliary methods _download_results() and _reduce_results().
The first mentioned downloads results from all slaves in parallel, the other method does
reduction on all results of the same type. The simplest implementation of get_results()
can have four lines of code with these methods.
Any method can be re-implemented if it is appropriate. In these cases it is strongly
recommended to implement necessary behaviour and call default methods from appropriate
places in new code.
8.2 Possible directions for development
The simplest way how to extend test suite is to write new plugins – tests. New plugins can
be developed ad-hoc as needed.
More interesting and also complicated direction is to extend test framework itself. One
of typical problems interconnected with testing is test parameters tunning. For example it
is necessary to test peak performance of some network service, which is distributed across
two servers. For testing purposes we have ten client machines, which can generate traffic to
servers.
The problem is to tune test parameters appropriately, so both servers are 100% loaded,
but not overloaded (“under Denial of Service attack”). For example framework proto-
col (obligatory object interfaces) can be extended with new methods raise_load() and
lower_load() and then individual plugin instances can be controlled by this way. On each
server a load monitoring plugin can run which can control other parts of system via new
methods.
Framework provides anyone-to-anyone communication utilities and all object are fully
open, so extensibility is virtually unlimited.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The first chapters of this thesis are dedicated to Kerberos protocol and environment anal-
ysis. After initial analysis it was concluded that the whole environment is too complex for
developing a single-purpose tool. Instead, general-purpose distributed test framework was
designed. Kerberos-specific modules are written as plugins for this framework.
Designed test framework is very flexible and general, it can be used for any distributed
testing. The framework and several test plugins were implemented and successfully evalu-
ated. With MIT Kerberos environment as an example it was verified that the framework is
useful for distributed testing of real applications.
Performance tests on various configurations of MIT Kerberos were conducted and results
were discussed with its authors directly on Kerberos Developers Mailing List. By using the
test suite several performance problems were identified and described in chapter 7. Two of
them have a significant impact on client and KDC side.
The first problem is specific to client side in Fedora distribution. It was reported to
appropriate maintainer and is being solved now. The second major problem affects all
versions of KDC. Various solutions were discussed on mailing list and some preliminary
patches exist.
The main contribution is that the distributed test framework was developed and is
ready for deployment. It was designed with extensibility in mind and has a potential to
accommodate to any few features.
This thesis doesn’t cover wide scope of test plugins for various application protocols.
Future work can build on this framework and focus on creating new test plugins, e.g. for
application protocols like HTTP etc. Possibilities of future development are described in
chapter 8.
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Appendix A
DVD content
Please read README files on DVD before experimenting.
/........................................................................DVD root
cfg.................................................. example configuration files
install...............................RPM and PyDist packages for installation
pcap.................................packet capture files (suitable for Wireshark)
raw_data....................................................raw measured data
scripts.......................................scripts for raw data processing
src.................................................................source code
pts.......................................Performance Test Suite source code
pts.doc........................................documentation for developers
thesis..............................................this thesis – source code
thesis........................................................this thesis – PDF
vm..........................................Fedora 16 virtual machines for KVM
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